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Abstract
Using a very large panel dataset of Italian manufacturing ¿rms, we test an empirical
model of foreign markets participation with sunk costs. The period of analysis (1982-
1999) is exceptionally informative: the large ￿uctuations in the lira exchange rate determined
substantial ￿ows of ¿rms in and out of foreign markets. We ¿nd that sunk costs of exporting
arevery important: past experiencein foreignmarketsincreasestheprobability ofexporting by
about 70 percentage points. Although the assets entailing such costs depreciate quite slowly,
new exporters have to acquire them very soon after entry. Altogether, these results suggest
that the break in the Italian aggregate export supply function caused by the depreciation of the
1990s can be considerable and long-lasting. We then relate sunk costs to ¿rm size and ¿nd that
they are an important barrier to export, especially for the myriad of Italian small and medium
¿rms. Finally, we provide some new evidence that sunk costs are indeed related to the need to
collect information on foreign market/country characteristics.
JEL classi¿cation: F10, L10, L60, C25.















￿Banca d’Italia, Economic Research Department.1. Introduction
1
Empirical work and anecdotal evidence on trade ￿ows suggest various kinds of
asymmetry in the response of exports and imports to exchange rate ￿uctuations. Comparable
exchange rate variations may produce different effects in different countries￿ differences can
also emerge in a given country at different dates. Sometimes, the consequences of large
depreciations (or, equivalently, appreciations) may be less evident than those of smaller ones.
Again, whilelargeincreasesin exportsfollowadepreciation, no similar reductionsoccur when
the exchange rate goes back to its pre depreciation level.
As pointed out by a series of theoretical papers in the late 1980s (Baldwin, 1988 and
1989￿ Baldwin and Krugman, 1989￿ Dixit, 1989a￿ Krugman, 1989), sunk costs of exporting
may help explain these puzzles. A ¿rm paying sunk costs to enter foreign markets is indeed
more reluctant to abandon them. As a result, ¿rms differing only in their exporting status may
make different export participation decisions. By aggregation, the effects of a given exchange
rate ￿uctuation differ across time and across countries simply because the type and the number
of incumbent exporters are different. Also hysteresis in trade ￿ows may emerge: temporary
shocks determining a massive entry of ¿rms in foreign markets can have permanent effects
since ¿rms, after paying sunk costs, ¿nd it convenient to stay in the market even when the
shock ends.
Recently, a few papers have tested the existence of sunk costs of exporting using ¿rm-
level data. The seminal paper is by Roberts and Tybout (1997) who derive and estimate a
model of a ¿rm’s decision to export. According to the theoretical model, if sunk costs matter,
there is a range of values over foreign market pro¿tability where exporters keep exporting
while non-exporters do not start to do so￿ in other words, there is an inaction band, where
each ¿rm persists in its past behavior. Moreover, the size of the inaction band increases with
the amount of sunk costs. Using a sample of 650 Colombian plants for the period 1981-89,
4 We thank Chiara Bentivogli, Sergio de Nardis, Luigi Guiso, Francesco Paternò, Fabiano Schivardi, Luigi
Federico Signorini, Stefano Siviero and Roberto Tedeschi for their useful comments. We are also grateful to
seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, the 17th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association
(Venice, August 2002), the 29th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial
Economics (Madrid, September 2002), the 4th Annual Conference of the European Trade Study Group (Kiel,
September 2002) and the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Italian Association of Economists (Ferrara, October 2002).
We are solely responsible for any errors. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily re￿ect those of
the Bank of Italy. E-mail: bugamelli.matteo@insedia.interbusiness.it￿ l_infante@libero.it8
Roberts and Tybout (1997) exploit these features and empirically show that sunk costs matter
owing to the relevance of past exporting status for current exporting, i.e., the lagged dependent
variable in a Probit model of export participation. Using the same model, though sometimes
differently estimated, other scholars ¿nd a similar result. Bernard and Wagner (1998) do so in
the case of 7,600 German manufacturing plants between 1978 and 1992￿ Bernard and Jensen
(2001) for 13,600 US manufacturing plants in 1984-1992￿ Campa (2000) for 2,200 Spanish
manufacturing ¿rms in 1990-97.
In the last decade, Italy’s exports have gone through exceptional swings. According to
aggregate trade statistics, export quantities encountered major dif¿culties before the large lira
depreciation in 1992. Afterwards and until the occurrence of the Asian and Russian ¿nancial
crises in 1997, there was a great resurgence of exports: exporting became a more widespread
activity among Italian manufacturing ¿rms, exporters increased their market shares almost
everywhere, Italian products entered new markets for the ¿rst time - in particular developing
countries in South East Asia and Latin America. Subsequently, the crises slowed down Italy’s
sales abroad and reduced market shares
2.
Exploiting the huge variability in Italian data, the ¿rst goal of the paper is to verify
whether sunk costs are important for Italian exporters, too. We apply Roberts and Tybout’s
(1997)modelto avery largeunbalanced panelof Italian manufacturing ¿rmsand¿nd that sunk
costs are indeed important: exporting at time | ￿ ￿ increases a ¿rm’s probability of exporting
at time | by 70 percentage points. Moreover, this effect turns out to be much stronger than
that of the full set of the other ¿rm-speci¿c and macroeconomic regressors: moving from the
25th to 75th percentile of the distribution of ¿rms according to the estimated effect of these
regressors increases the probability of exporting by less than 10 percentage points.
Inlinewithpreviousworks,wealso¿ndthattheprobabilityofexportinggrowswith¿rm
size and productivity, while it decreases with average wages. Firms that are part of industrial
groups are more likely to gain access to foreign markets￿ t h es a m ei st r u ef o r¿rms located
in industrial districts, con¿rming the important positive role such industrial agglomerations
5 Undoubtedly, these events can be mapped into the evolution of the exchange rate of the lira. Looking
at the trade-weighted nominal effective exchange rate, the lira depreciated by 12.6 percent between August and
October 1992. Lateron, in 1995, another big drop producedfurther gains in terms ofpricecompetitiveness. After
the large appreciation of 1996, the nominal effective exchange rate of the lira was almost stable for a couple of
years before following the decline of the euro.9
play in Italy. Although we control for a wide set of ¿rm-speci¿c characteristics, sectors still
matter: ¿rms operating in sectors where Italy owns a comparative advantage have a higher
probability of exporting. Not surprisingly, the probability is greater after depreciations and
rises with world demand. Interestingly, domestic demand crowds out export participation to
some extent.
This paper represents an innovation with respect to the existing literature in three ways,
all aimed at identifying some of the characteristics of the assets whose acquisition entails sunk
costs of exporting. First, we carefully investigate timing issues￿ more precisely, we would
like to know how soon these assets must be acquired upon entry and how fast they depreciate
after exit
3. These questions are particularly relevant from an aggregate perspective: if the
depreciation rate is small and acquisition is immediate, then the break in the aggregate export
function that the 1990s lira turmoil caused in the presence of sunk costs of exporting should be
relatively long-lasting. Indeed, we ¿nd this is the case for Italy: the differential probability of
exporting between ¿rms with and without some past experience drops to zero when the former
have been out of foreign markets for at least 6 years￿ the degree of persistence is identical
across incumbent exporters with different experience.
We then move to another feature of sunk costs and ask whether they come in a ¿xed
amount or are proportional to a ¿rm’s level of activity. This amounts to looking at the
interaction between sunk costs and ¿rm size where the “¿xed amount hypothesis” would be
con¿rmed if the degree of persistence decreased with ¿rm size. We show that sunk costs
are indeed a strong barrier to exporting for small ¿rms￿ moreover, this turns out to be true
irrespective of sectoral specialization.
Finally, weaskwhat typeof assets¿rmsmustacquirebeforeenteringforeignmarkets. In
the economic and marketing literature, sunk costs of exporting stem from the need tp collect
information about foreign demand, learn about the functioning of the institutional and legal
environment in the foreign country, establish a distribution network abroad, and market and
promote the product to foreign consumers. Our dataset allows us to focus on the information-
related reasons. To this end, we distinguish ¿rms according to their “ability” to collect and
process information and ¿nd that more able ones display less persistence. This is to say that
information collection motives are an active component of sunk costs.
6 It should be pointed out that Roberts and Tybout (1997) also consider the depreciation issue.10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the dataset
and provide some general descriptive statistics. Section 3 is devoted to the theoretical model,
while a detailed description of the estimation strategy is given in section 4. After that, we
present the results (section 5) for the base model. We then focus on timing issues (section 6)￿
the interaction between sunk costs, on one side, and size and information, on the other, are in
sections 7 and 8 respectively. Some concluding remarks are left to the last section.
2. The data
In the empirical analysis we use a subsample of ¿rms from the Centrale dei Bilanci
(Company Accounts Data Service, CADS)
4. For approximately 30,000 ¿rms per year, CADS
collects information on a large number of balance sheet items and some ¿rm characteristics.
Data are available from 1982 to 1999. Balance sheets are reclassi¿ed in order to reduce the
dependence on accounting conventions used by each ¿rm to record income ¿gures and asset
values. The focus of CADS on the level of borrowing skews the sample towards larger ¿rms
and as a consequence towards northern ¿rms. Moreover, since banks deal mainly with ¿rms
that are creditworthy, the sample is also biased toward better than average borrowers.
After ruling out outliers and ¿rms in the ¿rst and in the last percentiles computed along
various dimensions, we end up with about 270,000 observations, corresponding to 31,000
different ¿rms. The distribution of ¿rms across years is described in the ¿rst row of Table
1: the size of our sample grows monotonically from 9,000 ¿rms in 1982 to 18,000 in 1994,
after that it drops to 11,000. About 10 per cent of ¿rms (precisely, 3,141 ¿rms) are present for
eighteen years￿ 50 per cent, however, are observed for at least 8 years and a small 5 per cent
for only one year. The percentage of exporters ￿uctuates between 30 and 40 until 1995￿ after
that, thanks to lira depreciations, it jumps to 50-60.
The sample has quite a good coverage: in terms of total value added and employment in
Italian manufacturing, our ¿rms cover between 21 and 30 per cent. Importantly, the coverage
of total exports, in nominal terms, is also very high (between 13.5 and 26.5 per cent).
7 Centrale dei Bilanci is the organization in charge of gathering and managing the data. It was established
in the early 1980s jointly by the Bank of Italy, the Italian Banking Association (ABI) and a pool of leading banks
with the aim of collecting and sharing information on borrowers. Thus, the sample is not randomly drawn since
¿rms enter only by borrowing from one of the pooled banks.11
In Table 2 we provide summary statistics for three different years (1985, 1990, 1995
should capture different cyclical points) for both the full sample and the subsample of
exporting¿rms. Figuresonsales,valueaddedandemployeesindicatethat, despitetheCADS’s
bias towards large ¿rms, smaller ones are still fairly well represented. In 1995 ¿rm size ranges
from 4 to more than 1,000 employees with a mean of 98 and a median of 58. In terms of sales,
value added and number of employees, the maximum, the mean and the median reach a peak
in 1995 and a trough in 1990. Average ¿rm age is around 20 years￿ the oldest ¿rm is 140
years old. The average wage grows over time from 21 to 28 (1995 equivalent) thousand euros.
Exporting ¿rms are on average larger, make more sales and have a higher value added. They
also pay higher wages.
Table 3 describes ¿rm distribution in terms of sectors and location. Over 70 per cent of
our ¿rms are located in the North, less than 10 per cent in the South. The sectoral distribution
(Nace Rev.1 classi¿cation - two digits) re￿ects Italian specialization, at least on a quality
level. The best represented industry is in fact the one producing industrial and commercial
machinery￿ many ¿rms (about 18 per cent) operate in the so-called traditional sectors (textiles,
apparel and leather), while very few belongs to the most innovative “computer and of¿ce
equipment” and “measuring and controlling instruments”. In the case of exporters only, the
share of¿rms operating in the sectors of specialization rises￿ moreover, theyare mainlylocated
in the northern part of Italy.
The propensity to export increases with ¿rm size (Table 4). In 1995 it ranges from
40.4 per cent for ¿rms with less than 50 employees to 75.2 for those with more than 300
employees. Moreover, these ¿gures increase signi¿cantly over time
5. Adding the sectoral
dimension, some interesting patterns emerge. Among small ¿rms, the propensity to export is
largest in traditional sectors, which is a clear indication on the structure of these industries.
On the contrary, ¿rms producing “industrial and commercial machinery” show high relative
propensities for each size class.
We now turn to some statistics on ￿ows of ¿rms in and out foreign markets (Table 5).
For a given pair of years, the top part of the table is a transition matrix: out of the number of
¿rms exporting at time | it gives the proportion of those exporting and not exporting at time
8 More precisely, the increases themselves are increasing with ¿rm size. Between 1985 and 1995, the
propensity to export grew by 20 per cent for small ¿rms, 23 per cent for medium ¿rms and 37 per cent for large
ones.12
| n￿ ￿ t h es a m ef o r¿rms not exporting at time |. The table therefore provides entry and exit
rates together with the degree of persistence in and out foreign markets. These ￿ows are then
related, in the median part of the table, to the percentage changes in the Italian real effective
exchange rate (REER, based on production prices), world export volume (WT) and Italian
domestic demand (DD)
6. The last two rows show the ratio between entering/exiting ¿rms’
exports and total exports in the sample.
Not surprisingly, entry (No| -Y e s |n￿ sequence) and exit (Yes| -N o |n￿) rates peaked
during the period 1992-95. Before the lira depreciation, the dif¿culties of Italian ¿rms on
foreign markets were quite evident: 30 per cent of exporters abandoned foreign markets in
1992￿ the following year this fraction jumped to 45.4 per cent. Later on, the large depreciation
of the lira supported entry: for 1993, 1994, 1995 the entry rates were respectively 17.2, 19.3
and 25.2. In 1994-95 the acceleration of foreign demand provided a further stimulus to new
exporters. It is important to note that in these years entering and exiting ¿rms produced one
third of total exports: this is to say that these ￿ows of ¿rms had a huge impact on Italian
aggregate trade, which is contrary to the ¿ndings of Campa (2000) on his sample of Spanish
¿rms
7.
In general, Table 5 shows quite a promising picture. The huge variance in the export
participation decisionin our datacreatesanideal environmentforempiricalanalysis. However,
t h ed a t aa l s os h o wal a r g ed e g r e eo fp e r s i s t e n c ei n¿rm behavior, which, as we previously
mentioned, will be thekey element for detecting the importanceof sunk costs in ourtheoretical
model. However, this is not enough to conclude that sunk costs of exporting matter: many ¿rm
and sector-speci¿c factors play an important rolein the decision to export￿ they are also hugely
heterogeneous across ¿rms. Therefore a more structural analysis is needed and this is what we
address in the next sections.
9 All three indices are equal to 100 in 1993. The real effective exchange rate is produced by the Bank of
Italy: the methodology is described in Economic Bulletin no. 26. World export volumes are taken from IMF, the
domestic demand index from Istat.
: Interestingly, since1997, although entry rates arenot much lower than their time average, thecontribution
of entering ¿rms to total export values has dramatically decreased. This points to a predominance of small
exporters/¿rms among new entrants, whichin turnmightre￿ect twofacts: the longhistoryof increasingopenness
of the Italian economy and the 1992-95 depreciations which fostered a thorough internationalization among
medium and large ¿rms.13
3. The theoretical model
Our theoretical model is taken from Roberts and Tybout (1997). We present it here
starting from a ¿rm’s static problem of export participation with no sunk costs of entry and
exit and then introducing a more general multiperiod structure with sunk costs. Finally, we
extend it to analyze a more general timing in the acquisition of the assets requiring sunk costs.
Let us de¿ne by Z￿c| ¿rm ￿’sp r o ¿ts from exporting at time |. Assuming zero entry and
exit costs and indicating with ^W
￿c| the pro¿t maximizing level of exports, the foreign market







￿c| ￿ S￿c|Ef|c~ ￿c|m^
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￿c|￿o+￿c| (1)
where +￿c| ’￿if ¿rm ￿ exports a positive amount at time | and f otherwise, R￿c| is the price
of ¿rm ￿’s output on foreign markets in domestic currency, which is likely to depend on the
quantity ^W
￿c|, on aggregate factors f| (exchange rate and world demand, above all) and on
various ¿rm characteristics
8 summarized by the vector ~￿c|. Reasonably, the same variables
also in￿uence the cost S￿c|. It is worth highlighting that equation (1) refers to the extra pro¿ts
from exporting, i.e., in excess of those made on the domestic market, and neglects theexported







￿ if Z￿c| ￿ f
f if Z￿c| ￿ f
￿
(2)
i.e., ¿rm ￿ exports if extra pro¿ts from exporting are non negative. In a multiperiod context,











where B is the one-period discount factor. If current revenues and costs do not depend on past
choices, then the ¿rm is called to maximize a sequence of static problems like (1) and the
solution is again (2).
One interesting case in which this condition of “intertemporal independence” does not
hold is when ¿rms must pay entry (and exit) costs that are partially sunk. In this case, the
; These characteristics impact on prices through costs, product quality, ef¿cacy of distribution and market-
ing policies, etc.14
participation problem differs if the ¿rm has paid such costs in the past or not. As a result,
an entering ¿rm must take into account foreign market future conditions￿ an exiting one must
consider that its current decision will heavily affect future pro¿ts by entailing sunk costs in
the case of re-entry into foreign markets. When we explicitly include these costs, per period
pro¿ts from exporting become
q
Z￿c| E+￿c|3￿￿’+￿c| dZ￿c| ￿ E￿ ￿ +￿c|3￿￿go ￿ E￿ ￿ +￿c|￿+￿c|3￿8 (4)
where +￿c|3￿ de¿nes ¿rm ￿’s state (exporter versus non exporter) at the beginning of period |,
g is the level of (sunk) entrycosts and 8 is the one of (sunk) exit costs. The Bellman equation
for this problem is as follows
T￿c|E+￿c|3￿￿ ’ 4@ 
+￿c|Mtfc￿￿
q
Z￿c| E+￿c|3￿￿nB.| ET￿c|n￿E+￿c|￿￿ (5)
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where ￿ ’d .| ET￿c|n￿E+￿c| ’ ￿￿￿ ￿ .| ET￿c|n￿E+￿c| ’ f￿￿o.
The structural estimation of this model would entail choosing a speci¿c functional form
forthepro¿tfunction and aparticularprocessfor theexogenousaggregatevariable. Wechoose
instead the following reduced-form speci¿cation
￿hE+￿c| ’￿ ￿’x E kfcq+ ￿c|3￿c￿f |c￿~ ￿c|3￿c" ￿c|￿ (7)
where kf is a constant term, ~￿c|3￿ is lagged to avoid obvious endogeneity problems and "￿c|
is a random component. A positive and signi¿cant q would prove the existence of sunk costs.
More precisely, as a proxy for Eg n 8￿ it measures the width of the inaction band where
¿rms neither enter nor abandon foreign markets
9. It is worth recalling that here sunk costs are
< In a diagram with export market pro¿tability on the vertical axis and time on the horizontal one, the upper
band abovewhich ¿rmsenter theforeign marketisincreasing in N￿ thelower band below which incumbent¿rms
abandon the market is decreasing in I.15
captured through persistence in a ¿rm’s behavior￿ the idea is that ¿rms with past experience in
foreign markets are more likely to be exporters today than those without that experience (state
dependence), ceteris paribus.
Equation (7) identi¿es a binary choice model that we estimate using a Probit
speci¿cation, i.e., xE￿￿ is assumed to be the standard normal distribution.
The model as speci¿ed above embeds some strong simpli¿cations. First of all, g
and 8 do not vary across ¿rms. This is highly implausible: the level of sunk costs must
differ according to the type of product - that may require different marketing strategies and
distribution policies - to ¿rm characteristics - size, location, relative importance of exports
in terms of total sales - and to foreign market features - large versus small, developed versus
developing. Inthe empirical analysis, werelax this assumptionallowingvariabilityacross ¿rm
size and level of exports. Secondly, equation (7) presumes that what matters is only last year
participation: in relaxing this assumption, we also amend the theoretical model (see Appendix
A for details).
4. The estimation strategy
The estimation of equation (7) raises a number of issues. The most important is the
classical omitted variable problem caused by unobserved ¿rm characteristics. The likely
correlation between unobservables and regressors results in inconsistent estimates of the
coef¿cients of the latter.
In our case, the problem is even more serious. To the extent that unobserved factors are
time invariant and therefore sources of persistence, they will be picked up by the coef¿cient
of the lagged dependent variable that would then be overestimated. This is what Heckman
(1981a) calls “spurious state dependence” problem. Notationally, this problem can be
represented by decomposing the residual "￿c| into two pieces:
"￿c| ’ ￿￿ n ￿￿c| (8)
where ￿￿ denotes time invariant ¿rm-speci¿c unobserved characteristics and ￿￿c| is the truly
random component.16
How do we deal with this? One strategy would be to control for as many ¿rm
characteristics as possible to empty ￿￿ of any signi¿cance in the estimate: it is quite intuitive
that this strategy ¿nds an obvious limit in the content of the dataset. Therefore an alternative,
usually feasible in panel data estimation, is the within estimator that explicitly accounts for
unobserved factors through ¿rm level ¿xed effects. Unfortunately, we can not pursue this
because of the “incidental parameters problem”. As argued by Heckman (1981b), the use
of ¿xed effects in probit and logit models provides inconsistent estimates if the number of
¿rms/individuals is very large, as in our case. This inconsistency becomes even more serious
in dynamic models.
Wethereforefollowa different strategy which hasbeen proposed byChamberlain (1984)
and recently implemented by Arulampalam et al. (1998) and Henley (2001). Chamberlain’s
solution simply amounts to adding a regressor proxying for unobserved heterogeneity which
is correlated with observables￿ in our case, this new regressor is the vector of the observable
characteristic means, i.e.,





where now 1￿ is by construction orthogonal to ~￿c| for any ￿ and any |
10.
In conclusion, we solve the omitted variable problem of equation (7) substituting "￿c|
with equations (8) and (9) to get
11
￿hE+￿c| ’￿ ￿’x E k
￿





The estimation of dynamic models like ours faces another serious dif¿culty, known as
the “initial conditions problem” (Heckman, 1981b). This concerns the exporting status of a
¿rm in its ¿rst year of observation, i.e., +￿cf which is not very likely to be the ¿rm’s ¿rst year
43 In other words, ￿l is that part of unobserved heterogeneity that is not correlated with observed ¿rm char-
acteristics. It must be also noticed that, given the orthogonality between yl and xl>w, ￿l is also orthogonal to
xl>w.
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of existence
12. For obvious reasons, this observation is not modelled when estimating equation
(10) since the sample does not provide the lagged status and the other lagged controls. One
importantconsequenceis that+￿cf iscorrelatedwith1￿cf sothattheestimateofq isinconsistent.
More seriously, if unobserved factorsare positively related to the probability of exporting, then
q is overestimated so as to spuriously conclude in favor of high sunk costs. To account for this
problem we again follow Heckman (1981b) who suggests estimating a reduced form equation
to model the ¿rst year observation:




equation (11) differs from equation (10) only because it lacks the lagged dependent variable.
Here we follow Orme (1999) and tackle the two equations (10 and 11) model in two
steps
13: in the spirit of Heckman selection bias procedure, we ¿rst estimate the presample
equation (11) using the ¿rst three observations of each ¿rm, then we plug the estimated
residuals
￿
# in equation (10) to get
￿hE+￿c| ’￿ ￿’x E k
￿







w i t ht h ei d e at h a t
￿
#￿ proxies for that part of unobserved heterogeneity which is correlated with
+￿cf so that /￿ is at the end the remaining unobserved heterogeneity that is now orthogonal both
to the lagged dependent variable and to the other ¿rm-speci¿cr e g r e s s o r s .
Finally, we follow Roberts and Tybout (1997) and assume that ￿￿c| has a ¿rst-order
autoregressivestructure,￿￿c| ’ 4￿￿c|3￿n￿￿c|,which aimsto accountfor thepersistencethatmay
derive from transitory shocks. Now it is ￿￿c| to be independently and identically distributed.
We estimate both equations (11) and (12) with a random effect probit model.
45 More elegantly, Arulampalam et al. (1998) write: “...the start of the observation period does not coincide
with the start of the stochastic process generating [exporting] experience.”
46 It must be said that this simplifying two-step estimation procedure would be a good approximation of a
more complete model only if the correlation between ￿l and ￿l is small. However, Arulampalam (1998) has
shown that the procedure provides acceptable results in a wider variety of cases.18
Withthisspeci¿cation, weslightlyinnovatewithrespet totheexistingliterature. Roberts
and Tybout (1997) and Campa (2000), who estimate a random effects probit model with initial
conditions, do not introduce the vector of means to control for unobserved heterogeneity: our
results will show instead that it is an important correction. Bernard and Wagner (1998) and
Bernard and Jensen (2001) also choose not to implement the presample estimation
14.
5. The results
The results from the estimation of equation (12) are shown in Table 6
15. In column
[1] they refer to a simpler speci¿cation not including ¿rm-speci¿c regressors, the vector
of their means and the correction for the initial conditions
16 but only three macroeconomic
variables
17. The Italian real effective exchange rate based on domestic production prices
(-..-), a measure of Italian products price competitiveness on international markets, has
the expected effect: the probability of exporting is higher in years of real depreciation of the
domesticcurrency (increaseoftheindex). ‘A, whichindexes worldtradeconditions, hasalso
a positive signsince ¿rms are more likely export when facing higher external demand. Finally,
the negative effect of domestic demand (((￿ suggests that Italian ¿rms sell abroad especially
when demand is scant in Italy￿ surprisingly, the coef¿cient of (( is, in absolute terms, larger
than the (positive) one of foreign demand, indicating that foreign market participation is more
reactive to domestic than to external conditions
18. With this speci¿cation, sunk costs seem to
be quite important: from the coef¿cient of +|3￿, past experience makes current exporting an
almost certain activity (the marginal effect, which is reported in curly brackets, is about .90).
47 They do not estimate a Probit model but a linear probability one without any individual effect, then in
levels with ¿xed effects, ¿nally in differences.
48 The drop in the number of observations (from 270,000 to 160,000) is due to the combined effect of the
presample model, using 85,000 observations, and the lagged depedent variable, |w￿4, excluding ¿rms observed
for less than two consecutive years.
49 Obviously, we will appreciate their contribution by including them in the regression one at a time.
4: In our view, these three variables provide a more interesting description of the effects of the macroeco-
nomic environment on export participation than what can beinferred in other papers: Roberts and Tybout (1997),
Bernard and Wagner (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (2001) use time dummies￿ Campa (2000) looks at the effect
of the exchange rate but does not control for foreign and domestic demand.
4; Speculatively, this might be due to the small size and therefore the low internazionalization of the average
Italian manufacturing ¿rm.19
In column [2] we appreciate the impact of the presample estimation, which is reported
in Appendix 1. The correction term (oer) has a strongly signi¿cant coef¿cient (| ￿ r|@|￿r|￿S
22￿eb), signalling that we had an initial conditions problem in column [1]. As a result, the
marginal effect of +|3￿ drops to .819 from .866, but remains quite high and signi¿cant.
We then introduce sector and location dummies
19,a n daw i d es e to f¿rm-speci¿c
variables (column [3]), whose effect is, expectedly, to signi¿cantly reduce persistence in +|3￿:
the marginal effect of export experience reduces by 10 per cent to .74.
The control for ¿rm size is needed for various reasons: Krugman (1984) argues that
¿rms may decide to export part of their production in order to exploit scale economies
20￿
often size is interpreted as a proxy for a ¿rm’s success and ef¿ciency. Indeed, we ¿nd that the
coef¿cient of r￿5e (which is thelogarithm ofthe number of employees) ispositiveand strongly
signi¿cant
21. Firm age (@}e￿, often used to proxy for ¿rm ef¿ciency
22, does not play any role
in our model
23. Typically, exporting activity is for productive and cost-competitive ¿rms
24.W e
therefore include labor productivity (+￿Jo& is the log of the value added per worker at 1995
constant prices) and average wage (￿@}e is the log of the ratio between total labor costs, at
1995 constant prices, and thenumber ofemployees), which havetheexpected sign, positivefor
productivity and negative for wage. It is worth mentioning that ￿@}e measures cost and price
competitiveness in that we explicitly control for ¿rm productivity: interestingly, if we drop
4< See Table 3 for details.
53 As argued by Basevi (1970), itmight be thata ¿rm sells abroad even at a lower price than the average total
cost just to exploit the overall cost reduction deriving from the expansion of production.
54 The positive relationship between ¿rm size and propensity to export has already found vast empirical sup-
port:amongothers, Bernard andJensen(1998) ¿nd thatUSexporters displayex antefaster sales and employment
growth than non-exporters￿ Ferragina and Quintieri (2001) show that Italian exporting ¿rms are ex ante larger.
55 Tybout (1996) for Chile and Roberts (1996) for Colombia ¿nd that the probability of failure declines with
plantage. According to Liuand Tybout(1996), failingColombian¿rms arealways less productivethansurviving
ones. For the US, the same patterns are found by Dunne et al. (1989). The underlying idea is that market forces
select out inef¿cient producers so that older ¿rms are more ef¿cient and therefore more competitive in world
markets.
56 Relying on previous evidence for Italian manufacturing ¿rms (Bugamelli et al., 2000), we allow for a non
linear relationship between age and probability of exporting.
57 Among the others, Bernard and Wagner (1997) show that highly productive German ¿rms are more likely
to become exporters. For some developing countries, Clerides et al. (1998) ¿nd that this probability is greater in
low cost ¿rms. Ferragina and Quintieri (2001) conclude that Italian exporters are more human capital intensive,
technologically more advanced, more productive and with lower unit labor costs.20
+￿Jo&, the coef¿cient of ￿@}e becomes marginally positive in that more productive ¿rms
also pay higher salaries. The variable 6@o&e|, given by the ratio of marketing, distribution
and advertising expenses to sales, aims to measure the degree of ¿rm (or, better, product)
visibility and, somehow, the quality of customer services: it turns out to have a signi¿cantly
positive effect on the probability of exporting.
A different feature of a ¿rm’sl o c a t i o ni sc a p t u r e db yt h ed u m m y_￿r|o that identi¿es
whether a ¿rm belongs to an industrial district
25. The positive role of industrial districts for the
Italianeconomy is well documented
26:h e r ew e¿nd that district ¿rms are indeedmore likely to
become exporters. This result deserves particular attention in the light of two considerations.
Given the sectoral dummies, the higher than average export propensity of district ¿rms is
not the result of their specialization in sectors of Italian comparative advantage (textiles and
clothing, leather and leather products, furniture, etc.)￿ rather, a positive network externalities
is at work within districts. Moreover, these externalities bene¿t small and medium size ¿rms
that, as just shown, face major dif¿culties in exporting. Finally and not surprisingly, ¿rms
belonging to industrial groups (in this case, the dummy variable }oJ￿R is equal to 1) ¿nd it
easier to export part of their production.
In column [4] we also introduce the percentage of sales that a ¿rm makes on foreign
markets (%r@,er￿. Intuitively, the higher it is, the more likely it is that a ¿rm will not abandon
foreign markets, irrespective of sunk costs of exporting. The persistence induced by a high
%r@,er has more to do with sunk costs of establishing the ¿r mi t s e l ft h a nw i t hs u n kc o s t so f
exporting￿ forsuch ¿rmsleavingforeign marketsissomehowequivalent to an economicfailure
or to a signi¿cant (and costly) reorganization of activity (for example, through a reduction of
employment and other inputs)
27. Its coef¿cient is signi¿cantly positive and helps to further
reduce the coef¿cient of +|3￿ whose marginal effect goes down to .725.
58 According to the Italian National Statistical Institute (Istat), a district is identi¿ed as a local labor system
which is a territorial grouping of municipalities where there is a certain degree of commuting by the resident
population, a high concentration of small and medium size ¿rms belonging to the same two-digit sector. To
construct our dummy variable, we have merged our dataset with the Industrial District Database constructed by
Istat.
59 Signorini (2000) offers a thourough and critical discussion and reviews a wide set of empirical works.
5: It can beargued that{vdohv also serves as a proxy for unobserved characteristics that are strongly relevant
for exporting activity (e.g., managers speak English).21
In the last column of the table we add the control for unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., the
vector of means of the regressors as suggested by Chamberlain (1984). More precisely, we
include all the time-varying ¿rm speci¿c regressors with the exception of the percentage of
exported sales, which, in the long run, is evidently endogenous to the participation decision.
Importantly, most of the coef¿cients of the lagged regressors remain signi¿cant, though
de¿nitely smaller. This correction turns out to be important: the marginal effect of +|3￿ is
now .70
28.
The sectoral and location dummies deserve a ¿nal comment. Despite the wide set of
¿rm level controls, international specialization still matters. The probability of exporting is
signi¿cantly largerfor textiles, apparel, leather andleather products, industrial and commercial
machinery, furniture and ¿xtures. Firms located in the South and, to a lesser extent, in
the central part of Italy lag behind￿ this could re￿ect both their smaller degree of industrial
development and their bigger distance from the main destination markets (e.g., EU countries).
The model performs quite well. Comparing the actual exporting frequencies and the
predicted probabilities for past exporters (+|3￿ ’￿ ￿and past non-exporters (+|3￿ ’f ￿ ,t h e
differences are minimal (see Table 7).
A nice and succinct way to assess the importance of export experience relative to the
other regressors (both ¿rm-speci¿c and aggregate) is provided in Table 8. The percentiles
refer to the distribution of ¿rms in terms of predicted probabilities of exporting computed
using the estimated coef¿cients for all the variables except +|3￿
29￿ these probabilities were
then computed separately for ¿rms with and without export experience.
Two results clearly emerge. Export experience matters much more than the other
regressors: the increase in the predicted probability due to experience ranges from 68 to 71
percentage points￿ it is slightly larger for ¿rms in the higher percentiles. Passing from the 25th
5; Not surprisingly, the interaction between |w￿4 and the macroeconomic variables signals that persistence
is much stronger when external conditions are relatively better. This means that the difference between the
“persistence in” and the entry rates in good periods is larger than the difference between the “persistence out”
and the exit rates in bad periods. Speculatively, we might conclude that entry costs are more relevant than exit
costs.



















to the 75th percentile has an impact in terms of probability whichis on average smaller than 10
percentage points. Although it is larger in absoluteterms for ¿rms already exporting, it is more
signi¿cant in relative terms for ¿rms still out of foreign markets whose predicted probability
increases by almost 50 per cent.
5.1 Robustness
Our results are robust to various changes in the dataset and the empirical speci¿cation.
Up to now wehave kept in the dataset all¿rms with reasonable ¿gures so as tomaximize
the dimension of the working sample. However, this does not exclude the risk that some ¿rms
with very peculiar characteristics/behavior may drive the results, such as ¿rms that have been
in the sample for less than three consecutive years
30. Since persistence of a ¿rm’sb e h a v i o r
is more likely over short than long periods, these ¿r m sm a yd i s p l a ya na r t i ¿cially higher
than average persistence and so induce an upward bias in the coef¿cient of +|3￿. A similar
overestimation can, in theory, be induced by ¿rms intermittently appearing and disappearing
from the sample. Given the dataset’s bias toward better ¿rms, these “marginal” ¿rms may
appear in periods of good performance when they also export and disappear in bad periods
when instead they make zero sales on foreign markets. This in-and-out of the export market
that would reduce overall persistence is de facto not considered in our estimation. We have
therefore excluded these ¿rms and re-estimated the last speci¿cation (column [6] of Table 6)
obtaining, in both cases, the same results.
Small exporters can instead cause an underestimation of q. The reason is quite intuitive.
Firms can export very small amounts without getting any real access to foreign markets but
simply matching demand from an importer that has its own distribution network. Indeed,
excluding ¿rms that exported less than 200,000 euros in a year raises the coef¿cient of the
lagged dependent variable slightly to 2.07.
One can argue that an AR(1) structure of the error does not capture all the persistence
that may derive from transitory exogenous shocks. We have therefore extended it to an AR(2)
without recording any difference in the results. The same happened adding more lags of the
¿rm-speci¿cr e g r e s s o r s .
63 In the speci¿cation with just one lag of the dependent variable they are not necessarily dropped by the
estimation procedure.23
Finally, we have increased the disaggregation of the location (96 provinces instead of
four macro-areas) and sectoral (4 instead of 2 digits) dummies to control for ¿xed effects that
might be strong at the local and/or product level. Again we register no relevant changes.
6. Timing
S of a rw eh a v ea s s u m e dav e r ys i m p l i ¿ed structure for export experience: ¿rms that
exported two or three years earlier should behave as ¿rms that have never exported￿ exporters’
behavior does not differ with the number of years a ¿rm has been present on foreign markets.
In other words, the model above implies that all the assets whose acquisition entails sunk costs
depreciate completely after one period and must be acquired immediately upon entry.
The objective of this section is to relax these assumptions and allow for a smaller
depreciation rate, which is particularly reasonable if sunk costs have to do with knowledge
and reputation, and for the spread of acquisition over some periods.
Depreciation is detected through the estimation of equation (1) where we add dummy
variables to capture the number of years a ¿rm has been out of foreign markets. The
interpretation ofthecoef¿cients is identical tothat of +|3￿: apositiveandsigni¿cant coef¿cient
for t|3￿ says that a ¿rm that exported last time ￿ years ago is more persistent than one that
has never exported or did so more than ￿ years ago: this is to say that in the event of re-
entry this ¿rm has to acquire only a fraction of the assets needed for export. We would also
expect the coef¿cient of t|3￿ to be decreasing in ￿ as a signal that some depreciation occurs
notwithstanding.
In Table 9 we report only the coef¿cientsof export experience: the estimated coef¿cients
for all the regressors included in column [6] of Table 6 are unchanged. The coef¿cient of the
second lag (t|32) is strongly signi¿cant and positive: ¿rms that exported two years ago have
a higher probability of exporting today than ¿rms that have never exported. However, the
fact that the coef¿cient of t|32 is signi¿cantly smaller than that of +|3￿ signals that some
depreciation is at work: in terms of marginal effects, it ranges from .70 to .20. When adding
the third lag, this evidence is fully con¿rmed
31. We also found (but not do report here) that
64 The addition of more lags makes |w￿4 more capable of measuring the differential persistence between
exporters and ¿rms that have never exported sincepersistence of ¿rms that ceased exporting just few years before24
the coef¿cient of t|3￿ dies out at ￿ ’S , which indicates signi¿cant overall effects of export
experience.
We then tackle the problem of how assets for exporting activity are acquired during a
¿rm’s export experience. In column [3] we estimate equation (1) and include one lag that aims
to single out (from the mass of ¿rms exporting at | ￿ ￿￿ ¿rms that did not export between
32
| ￿ S and | ￿ 2￿ The coef¿cient of 7|3￿ is not signi¿cantly different from zero. The evidence
that sunk costs must be fully paid in theentry period is con¿rmed in columns [4] and [5] where
exporters with two and three years of experience respectively are identi¿ed.
The combination of these two results suggests that persistence in foreign market
participation could have very long-lasting effects that are also very strong right from the
beginning. In a sense, this evidence suggests that the structural change that occurred in the
Italian aggregate export function after the lira depreciations of 1992 and 1995 should be still
there: owing to the strong and prolonged persistence subsequent reappreciations (particularly,
in 1996) should not have had too big an impact on the aggregate function.
7. Size
So far we have imposed a unique sunk costs coef¿cient on all ¿rms, which is admittedly
a quite strong assumption. In this section we relax it, distinguishing ¿rms according to their
size. In doing so, we can also test the relative importance of two hypotheses, one proposed by
Caves (1989), the other by Tybout (2001).
If sunk costs relate to information acquisition, organizational matters and similar things,
Caves (1989) argues they should come in an almost ¿xed amount irrespective of ¿rm size. As
a consequence, small ¿rms would encounter relatively higher barriers to entry into foreign
markets
33. Similarly, large ¿rms can more easily adjust to ￿uctuations in export market
pro¿tability through entry and exit.
w is now captured by \w￿m. As a result, the coef¿cient of |w￿4 grows.
65 T h ec h o i c eo fw ￿ 9 is related to our previous result.
66 The result is qualitatively the same if sunk costs are an increasing but concave function of ¿rm size.25
Caves’s hypothesis can be tested against the (not necessarily) alternative view proposed
by Tybout (2001), which argues that what matters is not ¿rm size but the size of exports. His
idea is that ¿rms value the level of sunk costs of exporting in terms of the amount of sales they
would help to generate in foreign markets.
Table 10 summarizes the results that are de¿nitively in favor of Caves’ sv i e w
34. While
the interaction of lagged export participation with size of exports (measured as the yearly
deviation from its sample mean) is not signi¿cant (column [1]), the one with ¿rm size (again
in deviation from its yearly mean) is highly signi¿cant (column [2]). The result holds when
both terms are included (column [3]).
One might argue that size is simplya proxy for technology. Firms in sectors like textiles,
clothing and leather are smaller because their production technologies do not entail increasing
returns to scale. The same technologies, along with speci¿c marketing and distribution
policies, might also impose higher sunk costs of exporting: for example, it is widely accepted
that traditional Italian products compete on international markets through their better quality,
which might require more aggressive (and costly) marketing strategies.
In column [4] we add the interaction between +|3￿ and the sectoral dummies to control
for this alternative explanation. The results are clear-cut. Firm size really matters: its
negative coef¿cient decreases in absolute terms by a negligible amount and remains highly
signi¿cant. Moreover, the new interaction terms are to a large extent not different from zero,
with the exception of leather and industrial and commercial machinery, where ¿rms show a
signi¿cantly lower (and also similar) degree of persistence.
8. Information
A natural question that arises when thinking of sunk costs of exporting is about their
nature. It is commonly accepted that one important component of sunk costs is the acquisition
of information on foreign market demand and various institutional aspects. In this section we
show that information does indeed affect persistence in and out foreign markets and therefore,
given our modeling strategy, requires ¿rms to pay sunk entry costs. It is worth mentioning that
67 Again we work on the full model of column [6] in Table 6.26
we simply testify that information collection issues have to do with sunk costs, but we are not
capable of measuring their relative importance.
A way of detecting the importance of information is to separate ¿rms according to
the ease with which they overcome informational barriers, that gain importance the more
expensive and/or inef¿cient the process of collecting, processing and storing information
becomes. We conclude that information is important if ¿rms facing ex ante lower barriers
also had a smaller inaction band (i.e., a lower coef¿cient of +|3￿).
Informational barriers vary across ¿rms through two main channels. One indirect
channel is ¿rms’ exposure to information spillovers. Along the lines traced by the theoretical
literature on social learning, there are two necessary conditions for an economic agent to learn
from others’ actions: a) sharing a similar decision problem (similarity)￿ b) easily and readily
observing such actions. Following Guiso and Schivardi (2000), the Italian industrial districts
are an useful laboratory for detecting the relevance of information spillovers: they satisfy, by
construction,conditiona), whiletherequirement of¿rms’physical proximity can satisfactorily
proxy condition b). We therefore interact the dummy variable _￿r|o with the lagged dependent
variable and ¿nd (column [1] of Table 11) that belonging to an industrial district does help
reduce the relevance of sunk costs of exporting.
Firms in industrial district are, by de¿nition, smaller than average. Thus, the industrial
district dummy may combine the positive effect of informational spillovers with the negative
one relating to ¿rm size. To control for the latter and let the former emerge, we add the
interaction between size and +|3￿. The result (column [3]) con¿rms our intuition.
Again one might argue that the industrial district dummy is in fact capturing some
technological aspects rather than informational spillovers: we have seen that two important
district sectors (“leather and leather products” and “industrial and commercial machinery”)
display less persistence than average. To wipe out any doubt, we explicitly take into account
sectoral speci¿cities of sunk costs, again through the interaction terms between +|3￿ and the
sectoral dummies. In column [3] we show that the informational spillover story still holds.
Firms may also differ as to their ability to directly collect, process and store information.
A possible way of testing this hypothesis is to subdivide ¿rms in terms of their endowment of
information and communication technologies (ICT). Reasonably, ¿rms that have made larger27
investmentsin these technologies arein principlebetter able to collect and process information
of any kind or, alternatively, can do it at lower costs and more ef¿ciently
35. Unfortunately, we
do not have data on ICT capital at ¿rm level￿ we therefore return to sectoral information.
To this end, we use the sectoral ratio between ICT capital and value added as computed
by Bugamelli and Pagano (2001) and identify the following ICT intensive sectors: “printing
and publishing”, “rubber and plastics products”, “fabricated metal products”, “industrial
and commercial machinery”, “computer and of¿ce equipment”, “measuring and controlling
instruments”, “motor vehicles and other transportation equipment”. The dummy variable U￿A
i se q u a lt o1i fa¿rm belongs to one of these sectors.
One consideration is worth making. The two groups we have created are satisfactorily
balanced in terms of both their relative contribution to Italian manufacturing value added and
their export propensity: we can therefore rule out the possibility that the results are driven by
comparative advantage rather than by ICT intensity. To this end, it should also be noticed that
while “industrial and commercial machinery” is considered ICT intensive, “leather and leather
products” is not.
Again our estimation (column [4]) supports the hypothesis that information matters for
sunk costs of exporting: the coef¿cient of U￿A ￿ +|3￿ is negative and highly signi¿cant
(| ￿ r|@|￿r|￿Sr -12.16). The results hold without variation when the interaction with ¿rm
size is added to the regression (column [5]).
9. Concluding remarks
Owing to the large ￿uctuations in the lira exchange rate, many Italian manufacturing
¿rms entered foreign markets during the 1990s and their contribution to aggregate exports
has been considerable. The importance of sunk costs of exporting and their relatively slow
depreciation rate also suggest that the Italian aggregate export supply function has changed
dramatically and that this change will be fairly long-lasting.
68 It is widely acknowledged that the Internet revolution has the potential to reduce the degree of inequality
among agents in terms of information collection: through Internet everybody can, in principle, learn about events
occuringinanycorneroftheglobe. Thisargumentshouldapplyevenmorestronglyto¿rms: business-to-business
and business-to-consumer activities identify new Internet-based and cheaper practices for getting in touch with
suppliers and customers.28
Despite that, entry into foreign markets is still an open issue in Italy, at least from a
policy perspective. This is true in general terms, since in 2000 only 17.3 per cent of Italian
manufacturing ¿rms were exporters. However, it becomes particularly relevant in the case of
small ¿rms. Our result that sunk costs constitute a special barrier to export for smaller ¿rms
must be combined with the evidence that such ¿rms represent a huge proportion of Italian
manufacturing ¿rms but have a very low export participation rate: whereas about 95 per cent
of Italian manufacturing ¿rms have fewer than 10 employees, not 3 per cent of them sold
products abroad during 2000.
We have also shown that export promoting policies should take care of ¿rms’
informational needs, at least to some extent. Not surprisingly, this is what happens in reality:
a large proportion of the export promoting measures currently in place in Italy - managed by
various government institutions -aimstoprovide informationonforeigncountries, onbusiness
opportunities abroad and similar.Appendices
A.1 Extensions of the theoretical model
In this appendix we describe how to modify the theoretical model to allow for a more
general timing structure in the acquisition of the assets necessary to obtain access to foreign
markets. Letus start with thedepreciation issue. To this end, we modify equation (7)following
Roberts and Tybout (1997). Identifying with g the sunk entry cost that must be paid by those
¿rms that have never exported or did so only a long time ago, we introduce another set of
dummies g￿ where ￿:￿ indicates the number of years the ¿rm has been out of the export










￿ E￿ ￿ +￿c|￿+￿c|3￿8 (A1)
where t￿c|3￿ ’ +￿c|3￿ ￿
￿3￿ T
&’￿
E￿ ￿ +￿c|3&￿ is equal to 1 when a ¿rm exported at | ￿ ￿, exited at
| ￿ ￿ n￿and did not re-enter afterwards
36:i nt h a tc a s e ,Eg￿ ￿ g￿ is added to g leaving
a re-entry cost equal to g￿. In line with a positive depreciation rate, we would expect
g2 ￿ g￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ g? ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ g. The equation we are going to estimate in this case is
then the following:
￿hE+￿c| ’￿ ￿’x E kfcq+ ￿c|3￿cq2t￿c|32c￿￿￿q￿t￿c|3￿c￿f |cw~ ￿c|c" ￿c|￿ (A2)
To distinguish, instead, the timing according to which ¿rms acquire the assets upon
entry, we identify with ￿￿ the sunk cost paid at time | by a ¿rm which entered ￿ years before
(after at least n periods out of foreign markets) and did not exit afterwards. The corresponding
















￿E￿ ￿ +￿c|￿+￿c|3￿8 (A3)
69 Obviously, \l>w￿m i se q u a lt oz e r oi na l lt h eo t h e rc a s e s .30
The equation to be estimated becomes:
￿hE+￿c| ’￿ ￿’x E kfcq+ ￿c|3￿cS ￿7￿c|3￿cS 27￿c|32c￿￿￿S ￿7￿c|3￿c￿f |cw~ ￿c|c" ￿c|￿ (A4)
A.2 The regressors
REER is the Italian real effective exchange rate (index￿ 1993=100) based on production
prices
WT is world export volumes (index￿ 1993=100)
DD is internal demand at constant prices (index￿ 1993=100)
size is the log of the number of employees
age is the log of ¿rm age
age2 is the log of squared ¿rm age
ywork is the log of (de￿ated) value added per employee
wage is the log of (de￿ated) average wage
market is marketing, advertising and distribution expenses over sales
xsales is the ratio of exported to total sales
distr is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a ¿rm belongs to an industrial district
group is a dummy equal to 1 if the ¿rm belongs to an industrial group
res is the residual of the presample model (“initial conditions”)
A.3 Initial conditions problem
Following Heckman (1982), we estimate equation (11) over the ¿rst three years of
observations for each ¿rm. The results are reported in the following table
37:
6: This means that the estimation also includes a constant term, the vector of means of the time-varying
regressors and the sectoral and location dummies (not reported here).31
Presample estimation
-..- .002 +￿Jo& .095
(.001) (.019)
‘A .002 ￿@}e -.056
(.001) (.028)
(( -.004 6@o&e| .965
(.002) (.184)
r￿5e .149 _￿r|o .051
(.018) (.008)






Notes: Random Effects Probit estimates, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. For a description of
the regressors see also Appendix 1.TablesTable 1
Sample size and coverage
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
SIZE
number of ¿rms in the sample 9,426 10,291 12,154 13,408 14,688 15,265
percentage of exporters 34.8 32.0 40.3 40.2 38.8 39.0
COVERAGE
value added (% of total manuf.) 21.4 22.1 23.4 24.6 26.0 26.5
employees (% of total manuf.) 21.2 21.8 23.3 24.3 25.2 25.7
exports (% of total manuf.) 14.0 13.5 19.0 20.1 21.4 21.5
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
SIZE
number of ¿rms in the sample 16,182 18,027 18,710 18,619 18,760 18,428
percentage of exporters 35.9 37.7 38.0 37.0 31.5 28.3
COVERAGE
value added (% of total manuf.) 26.7 27.6 28.7 29.3 29.4 29.8
employees (% of total manuf.) 26.7 28.1 28.8 28.4 27.5 27.2
exports (% of total manuf.) 21.5 23.3 24.2 24.3 20.3 18.6
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
SIZE
number of ¿rms in the sample 18,162 11,914 11,803 11,547 11,151 10,620
percentage of exporters 34.2 51.5 56.6 59.0 61.1 60.4
COVERAGE
value added (% of total manuf.) 29.2 25.6 25.5 24.8 23.5 22.5
employees (% of total manuf.) 27.0 23.6 24.1 23.4 22.7 21.7
exports (% of total manuf.) 23.4 24.3 26.5 26.5 26.1 24.9Table 2
Descriptive statistics
full sample subsample of exporters
1985 1990 1995 1985 1990 1995
sales 11,167 11,331 18,674 13,381 13,819 22,748
value added 3,065 2,984 4,847 3,752 3,651 6,015
employees 85 76 98 105 95 118
employees (median) 43 37 58 55 50 72
¿r m a g e 1 61 82 11 71 92 2
wage (per capita) 21.4 23.6 28.2 21.4 23.9 28.7
marketing expenses (% of sales) 3.1 3.4 0.7 3.5 3.9 1.0
Notes: Sample means. Sales, value added and wage are in thousands of 1995 euros.Table 3
Distribution of ¿rms by sector and location
1985 1990 1995
full exporters full exporters full exporter
sample sample sample
Food, beverages and tobacco 9.4 5.8 8.7 5.5 10.8 7.0
Textiles 10.2 12.0 9.5 11.3 10.7 12.2
Apparel and related products 4.1 5.2 4.1 5.1 3.8 4.2
Leather and leather products 4.4 6.8 4.7 7.0 5.0 5.4
Lumber and wood products 2.4 1.3 2.4 1.4 1.9 1.5
Paper and allied products 2.9 1.8 2.7 2.1 2.9 2.4
Printing and publishing 2.4 1.0 3.0 1.2 2.4 1.3
Petroleum re¿ning and related ind. 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2
Chemicals and allied products 6.1 5.3 5.6 4.9 6.0 6.1
Rubber and plastic products 5.7 5.9 5.7 5.6 5.9 6.2
Stone, clay, glass 7.8 5.5 7.2 5.6 6.1 4.7
Primary metal products 4.4 3.6 4.0 3.2 4.1 4.0
Fabricated metal products 10.2 9.0 10.6 9.4 9.6 9.6
Ind. and comm. machinery. 14.1 19.4 14.5 19.8 13.8 17.5
Computer and of¿ce equip. 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2
Electrical equipment 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.2 4.3 4.3
Audio, video and comm. equip. 1.9 1.9 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.7
Measuring and controlling instr. 1.6 2.1 1.8 2.2 1.9 2.0
Motor vehicles 1.7 2.1 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.4
Other transportation equip. 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.8
Furniture, ¿xtures and misc. 5.4 6.0 5.7 6.7 5.5 6.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
North West 44.7 49.3 44.1 47.2 44.1 48.3
North East 28.1 28.6 28.1 29.8 30.4 33.2
Centre 17.4 18.4 18.1 18.4 17.1 14.4
South 9.8 3.7 9.6 4.6 8.4 4.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: Percentage values. Manufacturing sectors are classi¿ed according to Nace Rev.1 - two digits. The north-
western part of Italy includes the following regions: Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardy and Liguria. North East: Trentino-
Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Emilia-Romagna. Centre: Tuscany, Umbria, Marche and Lazio. South:
Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia.Table 4
Propensity to export by sector and ¿rm size
1985 1990 1995
a) b) c) a) b) c) a) b) c)
Food, bever. and tobacco 20.2 34.1 35.2 20.7 31.8 30.2 26.3 43.8 55.6
Textiles 45.2 47.7 64.5 42.2 47.0 66.2 55.0 59.1 84.0
Apparel and related products 46.1 54.3 55.9 42.6 50.5 67.4 48.4 62.9 71.8
Leather and leather products 56.9 68.7 80.0 50.6 67.7 69.2 45.9 66.8 92.8
Lumber and wood products 13.2 35.3 25.0 16.7 37.7 20.0 31.9 51.7 75.0
Paper and allied products 18.5 34.5 60.0 20.9 39.8 66.7 27.2 50.3 94.4
Printing and publishing 9.3 22.1 33.3 10.2 24.1 28.6 15.6 35.3 35.7
Petrol. re¿ning and related 9.1 28.6 0.0 5.0 10.0 22.2 25.0 45.5 0.0
Chemicals and allied products 27.0 41.0 54.3 26.2 42.4 48.7 39.8 61.9 68.1
Rubber and plastic products 33.9 54.0 59.3 29.6 51.6 50.0 40.6 62.4 100.0
Stone, clay, glass 24.3 36.2 39.5 23.4 43.0 32.7 28.3 46.8 66.7
Primary metal products 23.0 42.5 58.5 20.6 40.2 45.7 35.8 60.7 72.0
Fabricated metal products 27.9 44.4 60.0 26.3 45.2 64.4 43.0 54.8 83.7
Ind. and comm.machinery 49.3 62.5 62.2 45.7 58.8 69.0 54.3 69.6 87.8
Computer and of¿ce equip. 11.1 35.3 50.0 20.0 33.3 62.5 27.8 50.0 83.3
Electrical equipment 33.7 45.3 48.9 30.0 43.9 34.4 37.4 59.3 71.7
Audio, video and com. equip. 36.7 41.7 50.0 26.0 45.2 39.4 25.8 63.0 51.6
Measur. and control instr. 48.6 53.6 72.7 40.0 52.7 65.2 39.0 56.6 80.8
Motor vehicles 36.9 51.7 68.4 32.1 39.3 55.0 52.9 56.4 71.1
Other transportation equip. 33.8 46.9 28.1 31.8 41.4 36.8 34.2 40.6 52.9
Furniture, ¿xtures and misc. 39.6 52.9 76.9 38.0 55.3 73.7 49.4 68.4 80.0
Total 33.6 47.8 54.7 31.7 47.2 51.8 40.4 58.6 75.2
Notes: Percentage values. a) ¿rms with less than 50 employees￿ b) ¿r m sw i t h5 1t o3 0 0e m p l o y e e s ￿ c) ¿rms with
more than 300 employees.Table 5
Entry, exit and persistence
| n￿ 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91
|
￿J ￿J 90.2 78.7 86.0 86.8 86.0 87.8 82.1 86.8 89.2
te r 9.7 21.3 14.0 14.2 14.0 12.2 17.9 13.2 10.8
te r ￿J 25.1 15.5 17.8 21.8 19.8 23.9 23.0 19.6 19.7
te r 74.9 84.5 82.2 78.2 80.2 76.1 77.0 80.4 80.3
change in-..- -3.0 -0.2 -1.1 6.1 3.4 2.4 2.1 4.2 -0.5
change in‘A 2.5 8.3 3.4 4.3 6.3 8.9 7.0 5.6 4.6
change in(( 0.4 3.2 3.1 2.7 4.0 3.8 2.9 2.6 2.1
f|n￿ entry 13.6 28.7 13.4 14.6 13.0 13.6 21.6 13.6 12.2
f| exit 21.5 10.6 13.2 16.7 14.6 18.8 15.7 12.9 12.8
| n￿ 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99
|
￿J ￿J 90.2 82.8 80.7 74.8 77.7 82.0 84.1 87.2
te r 9.8 17.2 19.3 25.2 22.3 18.0 15.9 12.8
te r ￿J 30.0 45.4 27.8 11.5 10.3 8.7 6.2 9.0
te r 70.0 54.6 72.2 88.5 89.7 91.3 93.8 91.0
change in-..- -2.3 -14.2 -2.0 -4.6 11.0 0.3 1.4 -2.8
change in‘A 4.4 3.8 10.0 10.0 6.2 10.4 4.6 5.6
change in(( 0.5 -4.5 2.1 2.2 0.6 2.7 3.0 2.8
f|n￿ entry 11.6 31.7 33.8 19.7 11.8 8.5 5.9 4.9
f| exit 24.6 31.2 15.9 5.4 5.9 4.8 3.1 5.5
Notes: Percentage values. te rand ￿J refer, respectively, to being or not being an exporter. Therefore the
sequences￿J￿te ridenti¿es entering ¿rms,te r￿￿Jexiting ¿rms,te r￿te rand￿J￿￿J, respectively,
the ¿rms that stay in and out foreign markets. In the upper part of the Table, the entry, exit and persistence rates are provided.
In the lower partf is the share over total exports due to entering and exiting ¿rms. -..-,‘Aand(( are described
in Appendix 1.Table 6
Base regression
[ 1 ][ 2 ][ 3 ][ 4 ][ 5 ]
+|3￿ 2.397* 2.265* 2.045* 2.001* 1.939*
(.009) (.010) (.010) (.012) (.012)
{.866} {.819} {.740} {.725} {.702}
-..-| .004* .005* .006* .006* .006*
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
‘A | .013* .014* .014* .013* .013*
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
((| -.033* -.036* -.035* -.034* -.033*
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
r￿5e|3￿ .168* .166* .076*
(.005) (.005) (.018)
@}e| -.347 -.286 -.349
(.366) (.365) (.367)
@}e2
| .156 .129 .157
(.173) (.173) (.173)
+￿Jo&|3￿ .168* .168* .097*
(.013) (.013) (.020)
￿@}e|3￿ -.070** -.071** -.102**
(.023) (.023) (.034)




_￿r|o .023* .022* .021*
(.005) (.005) (.005)
}oJ￿R .035* .033* .025**
(.010) (.010) (.010)
oer .270* .392* .375* .381*
(.012) (.011) (.012) (.012)
No. obs 162,283 159,214 159,214 159,214 159,214
￿oJK:￿2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Notes: Random Effects Probit estimates of equation (12)￿ heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets￿
marginal effects in curly brackets. The dependent variable is the current status (exporter vs non exporter)￿ +|3￿ is the
status at | ￿ ￿￿ for the other regressors see Appendix 1. All estimations include a constant term, from column [3] on they
also include sectoral and location dummies (according to the classi¿cations reported in Table 3). * identi¿es signi¿cance of
the coef¿cient at 0.1 per cent￿ ** identi¿es signi¿cance at 1 per cent.Table 7
Goodness of ¿t
actual predicted
+|3￿ ’f .154 .120 [.062]
+|3￿ ’￿ .815 .862 [.070]
Notes: Predicted probabilities from the estimation of the model in column [6] of Table 6. Standard errors are insquare
brackets.Table 8
Export experience vs the other regressors
2 5 t hp c t i l e 5 0 t hp c t i l e 7 5 t hp c t i l e
+|3￿ ’f .141 .166 .205
+|3￿ ’￿ .823 .871 .915
Notes: Predicted probabilities from the estimation of the model in column [6] of Table 6. Percentiles refer to the
distribution of ¿rms according to the predicted probabilities computed using the estimated coef¿cients for all the variables
except +|3￿.Table 9
Timing
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
+|3￿ 1.827* 1.926* 1.960* 1.958* 1.946*











No. obs 159,214 159,214 122,595 122,595 122,595
￿oJK:￿2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Notes: RandomEffectsProbitestimatesofequations(1)and(1)￿ heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets.
The dependent variable is the current status (exporter vs non exporter)￿ +|3￿ is the status at| ￿ ￿￿ the variable t|3￿ is a
dummy that takes on value equal to 1 if a ¿rm exported for the last time￿ years ago￿ the dummy7|3￿ i se q u a lt o1i fa¿rm
started exporting at| ￿ ￿: a detailed description can be found in Appendix A. All the estimations include all the regressors
of the full model of column [6] in Table 6 (therefore including a constant term, sectoral and location dummies). * identi¿es
signi¿cance of the coef¿cient at 0.1 per cent￿ ** identi¿es signi¿cance at 1 per cent.Table 10
Firm size and value of exports
[1] [2] [3] [4]
+|3￿ 1.939* 1.946* 1.946* 2.026*
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.195)
E_f ￿+￿|3￿ .001 .001 .001
(.002) (.003) (.003)
E_r￿5e ￿ +￿|3￿ -.057* -.057* -.054*
(.009) (.009) (.009)
r￿5e|3￿ .076* .102* .102* .100*
(.018) (.019) (.019) (.019)
No. obs 159,214 159,214 159,214 159,214
￿oJK:￿2 .000 .000 .000 .000
Notes: Random Effects Probit estimates￿ heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent
variable is the current status (exporter vs non exporter)￿ +|3￿ is the status at| ￿ ￿￿ _r￿5e is the number of employees in
deviation from the yearly (log)mean ￿_f is the value of exports in deviation from the yearly (log) mean. All the estimations
include all the regressors of the full model of column [6] in Table 6 (therefore including a constant term, sectoral and location
dummies). * identi¿es signi¿cance of the coef¿cient at 0.1 per cent￿ ** identi¿es signi¿cance at 1 per cent.Table 11
Information
[ 1 ][ 2 ][ 3 ][ 4 ][ 5 ]
+|3￿ 1.963* 1.973* 2.035* 1.994* 1.999*
(.015) (.015) (.195) (.014) (.014)
E_￿r|o ￿ +￿|3￿ -.026** -.030** -.025*
(.010) (.010) (.010)
EU￿A ￿ +￿|3￿ -.154* -.149*
(.018) (.018)
E_r￿5e ￿ +￿|3￿ -.059* -.055* -.054*
(.009) (.009) (.009)
No. obs 159,214 159,214 159,214 159,214 159,214
￿o J K:￿ 2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Notes: Random Effects Probit estimates￿ heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent
variable is the current status (exporters vs non exporter)￿ +|3￿ is the status at | ￿ ￿￿ U￿A is a dummy variable that
takes on a value equal to 1 for the sectors where the use of information and communication technologies is higher than
average: for the list of sectors see the text in Section 8. All the estimations include all the regressors of the full model of
column [6] in Table 6 (therefore including a constant term, sectoral and location dummies). * identi¿es signi¿cance of the
coef¿cient at 0.1 per cent￿ ** identi¿es signi¿cance at 1 per cent.References
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